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Abstract
Grade ination or soft grading is a common feature of the educational
systems of many countries. In this paper I analyse grade ination in a setting
in which students di¤er in social background, and the grading policy can
be targeted according to student type. I consider a signalling game where
rms decide whether to hire students and their salary after observing their
grades and social background, a university can inate grades, when students
decide whether to attend university. A targeted grade ination may have
redistributive e¤ects by raising the salary of students with disadvantaged
social background, if their grades are less inated than other students.
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1 Introduction
Grade ination arises when teachers award students with higher grades than
they deserve, leading to a high concentration of students with top grades. The
presence of grade ination makes it more di¢ cult to distinguish a students
ability, both in evaluating university applications and in job recruitment, and
brings about potential distortions. The presence of grade ination is nowa-
days a common feature in several educational systems. In the United States,
the evidence of grade ination has been recently documented by Rojstaczer
and Healy (2011), who collected historical data on letter grades awarded by
more than 200 four-year colleges and universities. Their results show the
drastic rise in the share of A grades awarded over the years.1 In Canada,
Allahar and Côté (2007) show that the 52.6 % of high-school graduates ap-
plying to universities in Ontario in 1995 had an A average, and then this rose
to 61% in 2004. Also in Ontario in 1995, the 9.4% of high school graduates
reported an A+ average and it increased to 14.9% in 2003. In addition, the
average grade of university applicants was 80% in 1997, and this percentage
has steadily increased since then. In the United Kingdom, graduates who ob-
tain a rst-class honours rose from 7.7% of total graduates in year 1996/97
to 14% in year 2008/09. For graduates with an upper-second honour, the
percentage rose from 41.1% of total graduates in year 1996/97 to 48% in year
2008/09 (Higher Education Statistic Agency). In Italy, the analysis Stella
reports one third of graduates achieved the highest grade (110/110) in 2004
and 2005 (Modica, 2008). The established presence of grade ination across
1In earlier contributions, Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) and Johnson (2003) survey the
empirical literature on grade ination in the U.S. The emergence of grade ination can
also be observed in Figlio and Lucas (2004), who analyse the impact of standard grades
in educational achievement in the Alachua County, Florida.
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countries requires the attention of policy makers. A theoretical understand-
ing of its consequences becomes necessary in order to design an adequate
policy intervention.
In this paper, I examine an education system in which studentsdi¤er in
social background and grading policy can be targeted according to a student
type. Like grades, students social background contributes to determining
their outcomes in the job market.2 A targeted grading policy can be inter-
preted as a tracking system, in which students di¤ering in social background
are separated at the beginning of the education program, due to a di¤er-
ent initial preparation. Another situation in which grading policy can be
targeted occurs in those disciplines in which studentsachievement can be
assessed in a very subjective way: in this case a targeted grading policy may
be undetected (so that it does not look discriminatory).
I consider a signalling game in a static setting, with a number of rms,
a university and students who di¤er both in ability and social background
as players. I assume that students with an advantaged social background
are more likely to have high ability, this due to the inuences of a better
environment to develop skills and by a stronger parental and social pressure
about life achievement. A university aims to maximise the job opportunities
of its students and may give a high grade to low-ability students. On the
other hand, each rm observes the studentsgrades and social backgrounds,
and wants to hire only high-ability students. Moreover, a rm is fully aware
of the grading policies adopted by the university.
The results suggest that optimally targeted grade ination may have re-
distributive e¤ects by raising the salary of disadvantaged students. This
outcome hinges upon the fact that the educational signal is worse for advan-
taged than disadvantaged students if the formersgrades are more inated
2There is large empirical evidence suggesting that the studentssocial background in-
uences their job opportunities. For instance, Glyn and Salverda (2000) and Berthoud
and Blekesaune (2006) show that a disadvantaged social background negatively a¤ects the
chance of nding a job in OECD countries and the United Kingdom, respectively.
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than the latters. In particular this result emerges when the lower level of
grade ination for disadvantaged students more than o¤sets the higher prob-
ability of having high ability of advantaged students, who thus have a higher
expected ability than advantaged students. Interestingly, this result may
occur with no redistributive intentions in the grading policy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briey
surveys some of the related literature. The model is presented in Section
3, and Section 4 examines the baseline results. Section 5 considers some
extensions of the baseline results. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case
with university competition, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The economic literature has only recently taken on interest in grade ination,
with then few but noteworthy contributions. Yang and Yip (2003) present a
model where universities have an incentive to inate grades and they mutu-
ally reinforce each others practice, thus determining a competitive e¤ect in
grade ination. This is due to the fact that each university does not consider
the collective reputation of graduates, but is willing to help some of its own
low-ability students by inating their grades, leading to a free-riding prob-
lem. Popov and Bernhardt (2013) develop a similar model to Yang and Yip
(2003) to identify the increase over time in the quantity of good jobs as a
driving force of grade ination. They also extend the analysis by considering
students with di¤erent social skills.
Chan et al. (2007) develop a signalling model where rms observe the
studentsgrade but are not aware of their ability and the proportion of tal-
ented ones in the population of students. This gives rise to an incentive to
help some low ability students by giving them good grades. They also show
that when the average qualities of students among schools are correlated,
soft grades are strategic complements, and thus inating schools mutually
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reinforce each others practices. Ehlers and Schwager (2012) modies the
analysis of Chan et al. (2007) by introducing a reputational element. They
add a second cohort of graduates that arrives on the labor market when the
rst cohort has already revealed their true ability and therefore the schools
grading policy. The reputation e¤ect may shrink the level of grade ination.
Bar et al. (2012) examine the recent policy of putting grades in con-
text, according to which American colleges can reveal the distribution of
grades in di¤erent disciplines to employers, in order to prevent the distor-
tion in information caused by grade ination. Accordingly, they propose a
framework where students can choose di¤erent courses and the university
can vary grading standards according to the course. They show that, when
information on grading policies is provided only to students, some of them
become more attracted to leniently graded courses, whereas if the informa-
tion is provided to both students and employers, some students choose the
strictly graded courses and some choose the leniently graded courses.
The main di¤erence between these papers and my analysis is that the
di¤erences in studentssocial background and grade ination is targeted ac-
cording to a student type.3 My analysis is mostly related to Schwager (2012),
3The paper is also related to the theoretical literature on educational standards, which
examines the criteria adopted by schools in evaluating students. Costrell (1994) considers
a policymaker who maximises social welfare under the assumption that utility-maximising
students choose whether to meet the standard, thus leading to the fact that earnings
are an endogenous function of educational achievement. The welfare analysis shows that
more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards. Betts (1998) instead argues that an
egalitarian policy maker might prefer higher standards than would a policy maker whose
goal was to maximize the sum of earnings. The result is based on the assumption of
heterogeneous ability among workers. As a consequence, a rise in educational standards
will increase the earnings of both the most-able and the least-able workers. The only
workers whose earnings fall are those workers who after the increase fail to continue meeting
the standard. Himmler and Schwager (2012) extend the Costrell (1994)s analysis by
assuming that, in addition to the standard, also the social origin a¤ects the wage earned
by graduates. For a given standard, students from disadvantaged backgrounds obtain a
lower wage than students from other social classes. Schools with a disadvantaged student
body set lower standards than other schools, even if the abilities of the disadvantaged
students are identical to those of others. Standards are inated in this way because the
wage discount experienced by graduates from unfavourable backgrounds depresses the
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who develops a labour matching model with grade ination and student dif-
fering in social background. In his paper, students are matched with rms
o¤ering di¤erent kinds of jobs, according to the grade and the expected abil-
ity. Regardless of social background, it is possible that mediocre students
receive a high grade caused by grade ination. Also, the high-ability stu-
dents from advantaged backgrounds may benet from grade ination since
this shields them from the competition on the part of able and disadvan-
taged students. Compared to this analysis, I share the same assumptions on
the distributions of ability with di¤ering social backgrounds, but Schwager
(2012) (i) focuses on the matching between workers and rms, whereas I do
not consider the matching in the labour market, and (ii) assumes the same
degree of grade ination along di¤erent social class, whereas I assume that
the university may target its grading policy.4 More importantly, in Schwa-
ger (2012) grade ination is a parameter, while in the present paper grade
ination is endogenously determined. Given the di¤erent framework, in my
results disadvantaged students may in fact benet from the presence of grade
ination.
3 The framework
For simplicity, I abstract from student e¤ort and from competition across
universities, and I focus on the interplay between students, one university
and a number of rms interested in hiring graduate workers.5
return to learning e¤ort for these students. They are thus less willing to satisfy any given
standard than students from an average social background.
4In Section 4.3.5 I examine how the equilibrium changes when grade ination cannot
be targeted, by obtaining qualitatively similar results to Schwager (2012).
5In Section 6 I illustrate how the baseline model can be developed by introducing
competition between universities.
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3.1 Students
I study an economy with a continuum of students, with measure normalised
to one. Students decide whether or not to attend university. University
admission does not involve any requirement apart for paying tuition fees. A
student who attends university will obtain a graduate degree with certainty,
and after the university period she will apply for a graduate job in one of the
rms.
Students can have high (H) or low (L) ability and an advantaged (a) or
disadvantaged (d) social background. Social background is public informa-
tion, and can be seen as a bivariate measure of family environment, income,
neighbourhood, peer e¤ects, ethnic origins and so forth.6 A student attends
university if tuition fees k 2 (0; 1) are lower than the probability of obtaining
a job, ji 2 [0; 1] ; where j 2 fH;Lg ; and i 2 fa; dg :
I denote as  2 (0; 1) the proportion of advantaged students, and pa; pd 2
(0; 1) as the probability that an advantaged or disadvantaged student has
high-ability, respectively. I assume pa > pd, that is students with advantaged
social background are more likely to have high ability. This assumption can
be justied as follows. Given the same distribution of innate ability within
a population with di¤ering social backgrounds, an advantaged environment
can foster development via parental and peer pressure so that, on average,
the overall ability is likely to be higher for students with an advantaged
background. The assumption is in line with past research documenting that
family and environmental factors are major predictors of the individualsabil-
ity (Cunha et al., 2006, Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, Joshi and McCulloc,
2000).
6Peer e¤ects arise if students learn better in a group of more able students. Relevant
empirical studies are, inter alia, Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson et al. (1978), Epple
et al. (2003) and Zimmer and Toma (2000). From a theoretical point of view, Arnott and
Rowse (1987), de Bartolome (1990) and Epple and Romano (1998) consider explicitly the
peer group e¤ect. In the present analysis the presence of peer-e¤ects is considered within
the background.
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3.2 University
The university prepares students for a nal exam, with equal teaching e¤ort
irrespective of the student type, and learns the students ability during the
period spent by a student at university, through their tests and assessments
results. The nal exam can be interpreted either as a grade for a nal test
or as the average grades among the university examinations. The possible
exam outcomes are a high (A) or a low (B) grade.
The university decides which grade to appoint each student type. I dene
gji 2 [0; 1] ; j 2 fH;Lg ; and i 2 fa; dg ; as the probability that the univer-
sity appoints an A grade to a ji student. I refer to grade inationwhen
the university appoints an L student with an A grade. The fact that the
university can di¤erentiate its grading according to a student background
can be interpreted in several ways. For instance, the university may track
students of di¤erent social origins, due to a di¤erent initial preparation. An-
other situation in which a targeted grading policy may take place emerges
in those university courses in which studentsachievement can be assessed
very subjectively. In this case a grading policy being targeted according to
student types is hard to be detected and easy to implement.
There is not a standard way of modeling university behaviour. In the
economic models of university (or school) competition, the number of enrolled
students or the overall amount of tuition fees enter in the school/university
objective function (Epple and Romano, 1998, Del Rey, 2001, De Fraja and
Iossa, 2002, Brunello and Rocco, 2008, Maldonado, 2008, Ferreyra, 2012,
inter alia). Other models propose a school objective function determined
by the average qualication (De Fraja and Landeras, 2006, De Fraja et al.,
2010, Albornoz et al., 2011), the average and the variance of the qualication
(Ritzen et al., 1979), the quality of school (Epple et al., 2003 and 2006)
and the quality or the attendance in the case of a public school (Epple et
al., 2002).7 Here I assume that a university wants the maxium number of
7Some recent contributions (Albornoz et al., 2011, Donze and Gunnes, 2011) rely on
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students to be hired, so that its objective function is as follows:
U = 1K (Ha) bHapaHa (gHa; za) + 1K (Hd) bHd (1  ) pdHd (gHd; zd) + (1)
1K (La) bLa (1  pa)La (gLa; za) + 1K (Ld) bLd (1  ) (1  pd)Ld (gLd; zd) ;
where 1K
 
ji

is the indicator function dened as
1K
 
ji

=
(
1 if ji 2 K
0 if ji =2 K
; K = fx 2 (0; 1] jx > kg j 2 fH;Lg ; i 2 fa; dg ;
(2)
and bji is the benet that the university obtains from the hiring of a ji stu-
dent. The indicator function says that the university benet is zero if tuition
fees are higher than the probability of obtaining a job for a student type,
ji (gji; zi) < k: This occurs since, in equilibrium, all the students belonging
to a specic type make the same decision about university attendance. I
denote as zi 2 [0; 1] ;  2 fA;Bg the probability that a rm hires a student
according to grade and social background (see the next paragraph). The
probability of being hired according to a student type is a function of the
university and rm behaviour, ji (gji; zi). In particular, this is given by the
probability that a student obtains a grade (A or B) times the probability that
a rm hires a student with that grade.8 Thus the probability of obtaining a
job according to a student type is given by
ji (gji; zi) =
(
gjizAi if the students scored A
(1  gji) zBi if the student scored B
: (3)
the goal theory(Covington, 2000), according to which achievement goals inuence the
quality, timing and appropriateness of the students engagement in their own learning.
This e¤ort together with innate ability a¤ect the students accomplishments. As a con-
sequence, parents and teachers play a key role in inuencing the studentsachievement
goals and, in turn, their e¤ort.
8As will be clear shortly, rms cannot observe a students ability and use the grade as
a signal of it.
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I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 bHa = bHd > bLa = bLd > 0.
In words, the university wants the maximum number of students to be
hired and values more the employment of an H student. Accordingly, (i)
each students employment increases the university reputation as an e¤ective
institution for obtaining a job and (ii) the university obtains a higher benet
from the hiring of H students which ensures the universities credibility to
rms. It is important to stress that, according to Assumption 1, the univer-
sity has no preferences whatsoever about a students social background.9
3.3 Firms
There is an exogenous number of J 2 [0; 1) identical rms in the gradu-
ate labour market, each rm is willing to hire at most a single graduate.
Firms observe the nal grade and the social background of students. The
public knowledge of social background seems plausible: in the real world, a
personnel manager can probably tell the job candidates social background
through some information such as ethnic origins, name, address, language
style, manners, clothing, and so on. Also, each rm is fully aware of the
universitys grading policy. The assumption that a rm knows the university
grading policy reects the situations in the real world in which either (i) an
educational institution claims its own grading policy, (ii) the grading policy
is public information due to reputation e¤ects or (iii) some policy interven-
tion induces them to reveal the distribution of grades, like putting grades
in contextin the United States (see Bar et al., 2012).
A rm hires with probability zi a student with background i 2 fa; dg who
graduated with grade  2 fA;Bg and o¤ers a single job type (a graduate
job). Also, I assume that ability of employees determines a rms prot
9In Section 5.2 I consider di¤erent assumptions about universitys preferences.
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entirely. In particular, each high- and low-ability graduate yields a net prot
of  > 0 and  1, respectively. The assumption of a negative prot by hiring
an L student can be interpreted in many ways: low-ability employees may
have a marginal productivity which is lower than salary cost. In addition,
a rm may want to lay o¤ an unproductive employee but this action still
comes at a cost, e.g. industrial disputes, wasted training costs and time, and
so on. Given these assumptions, a rms prot is given by:
F =  [1K (Ha) paHa (gHa; za) + 1K (Hd) (1  ) pdHd (gHd; zd)] (4)
  [1K (La)  (1  pa)La (gLa; za) + 1K (Ld) (1  ) (1  pd)Ld (gLd; zd)] :
Each rm maximises its own prot over zi. Once hired a student, then a rm
decides the level of salary, which is function of the expected prot generated
by that student, so that w = w
 
F (gji; ; pi)

; w0 () > 0. The presence
of many rms in the job market ensures that a job candidate with higher
expected productivity would receive a higher salary.10
Along the paper, I will refer to J as labour demand. The fact that J
cannot cover all of the students rules out the unrealistic case where the job
market is cleared, and has important consequences on the behaviour of the
university. As will be clear below, given the limited amount of job placements
and Assumption 1, the university will adopt a grading policy such that none
of the L students obtain a job at the expenses of an H student. In turn, in
equilibrium zi will equal 0 or 1 for all student types.
10In equilibrium, the di¤erence in salary according to expected ability will be in such a
way that a rm will be indi¤erent between hiring a job candidate with (positive) higher
or lower expected ability.
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3.4 The game
Figure 1 summarises the timing of the game. Nature draws the student types,
then, each student decides whether to attend university. If so, the university
grades the student in the nal exam. Finally, all the graduates apply for a job
in one of the rms, and rms decide whether to hire or not a job candidate
and, if so, her salary level.
Figure 1. The game timing
Stage 1. Nature Stage 2. Students Stage 3. University Stage 4. Firms
4 student types: decide whether to attend uni chooses the choose whether hiring
H or L with a or ! by comparing tuition fees ! grade to give to ! a graduate student
d background. with the chance of a job each student type. and her salary level.
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is a com-
bination of students, university and rms strategies and beliefs where all the
agents maximise their payo¤. After observing a grade, each rm has a belief,
consistent with Bayesrule, about the student type, conditional on all the
information it has: the students grade, the distribution of ability according
to the students social background and the university strategy.
For each grade, a rm must maximise its expected prot, given its belief
and the university strategy. Labour demand requires that the number of
hired graduates is at most J . Once a graduate is hired, a rm will o¤er a
salary being a function of the expected unitary prot. In turn the university
chooses its grading strategy in order to maximise its expected payo¤, given
the set of students, rms strategy and labour demand J .11 Finally, each
student decides whether to attend university by comparing the probability
of obtaining a job (determined by the university and rms strategies) with
the exogenous tuition fees.
11Notice that the university has complete information about the rms behaviour, there-
fore it is not necessary to determine its beliefs.
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I am now in a position to dene a rms beliefs about a students ability.
Denition 1 A rms beliefs on the students ability which are consistent
with the Bayesrule are
 (H jgji;A; pi ) = pigHi
pigHi + (1  pi) gLi ;
 (L jgji;A; pi ) = gLi (1  pi)
pigHi + (1  pi) gLi ;
(5)
for a student who obtained a grade A, and
 (H jgji;B; pi ) = 0;
 (L jgji;B; pi ) = 1;
(6)
for a student who obtained a grade B.
4 Results
4.1 The baseline problem
In this section I show the results of the baseline model. First notice that,
since a graduate who scored B has low ability with probability 1; then a
rm will never hire one of them, so that zBi = 0 for i 2 fa; dg. Indeed
while the university may want to inate the grade of a low-ability student
in order to increase the number of graduates who obtain a job, it would
never appoint a B to a high-ability student. This simplies the exposition of
the results and allows me to focus on A students. For the same token, it is
always better for the university to confer a grade A to an H student, as this
unambiguously raises the payo¤ of both the university and rms. Therefore,
in all the possible scenario the probability of an H student to obtain an A is
gHi = 1 for i 2 fa; dg :
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The expected payo¤ of hiring an A student with social background i
according to the beliefs (5) is
F (gLi;A; pi) =
pi  (1  pi) gLi
pi + (1  pi) gLi : (7)
A rm hires from a population of students if its expected payo¤ is positive,
F (gLi;A; pi) > 0. Assume for a moment that labour demand is J = 1: For
every i 2 fa; dg and pi  11+ ; a rms expected payo¤ (7) is positive for
gLi = 1: For pi < 11+ ; a rms expected payo¤ (7) is positive for gLi <
pi
(1 pi) ;
so that the university strategy is gLi =
pi
(1 pi)   ", with " > 0 a small number.
Hence the threshold point 1
1+
is a function of the rms benet from hiring
anH student, . The higher the benet, the higher the rms expected payo¤
by hiring an A student. Therefore a rm tends to hire more A students when
 is high, and in turn, the university more likely inates the studentsgrades.
Given Assumption 1, the university strategy ensures that the maximum
number of students would be hired and that all the students who scored A
are going to obtain a job.
Lemma 1 All the students who scored A will obtain a job.
Lemma 1 implies that a rms strategy is zAi = 1; so that equation (3)
becomes ji = gji, for every i 2 fa; dg and  = A. Therefore an L students
decides whether or not to attend university by comparing gLi with tuition
fees k and would attend it if and only if gLi > k; whereas all the H students
would attend university, as gHi = 1.
However job positions are limited because J < 1. Since the university
prefers that anH rather than an L student obtains a job, it will inate grades
at most for the amount of labour demand net to the share of H students,
denoted as
  pa + pd (1  ) ; (8)
so that the remainder of labour demand is J   : This ensures that none
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of the L students would obtain a job opportunity at the expenses of an H
student. Finally, if the expected prots are positive from hiring both an a
and a d students, then a rm compares the two expected prots, and o¤ers
a higher salary to the graduate type whose expected productivity is higher:
F (gLd;A; pd) =
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) 7
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) = 
F (gLa;A; pa) :
(9)
4.2 Equilibria with no grade ination
In this paragraph I show the cases in which no grade ination takes place. In
this setting, this situation may occur for two reasons: (i) there are too few
job positions while the university favours H over L students, or (ii) tuition
fees are higher than the probability of an L student to obtain a job. The
following Lemma shows the rst situation.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and J  . Then the university
never inates grades and a rm is indi¤erent to a students social background.
Proof. It follows directly from Assumption 1, bHd = bHa > bLd = bHa: Given
the available positions, the university objective function is maximised by not
inating grades, in order to favour H over L students.
If the number of jobs is lower than the number of H students, then
gHi < 1; so that they would attend university only if gHi > k. This situation
may be dened as grade deation equilibrium, since not all the H students
obtain a high grade. Consider now the case in which tuition fees are so high
that no L student would attend university.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and  < J < 1: For k > gLi and
i 2 fa; dg ; then none of the L students attend university, all the A students
have high ability, so that a rm is indi¤erent about social background.
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In either of these two cases described, a rm maximises its payo¤ by
hiring all the A students possible given J , as all the A students have high
ability with probability 1:
4.3 Equilibria with grade ination
Consider next the more general case in which labour demand is larger than
the number of high ability students and tuitions fees are su¢ ciently low,
according to the following assumption.
Assumption 2  < J < 1; k < gLa and k 7 gLd:
According to Assumption 2, two possible situations may occur: one in
which tuition fees are lower than the probability of obtaining an A for both
L a and d students, and another in which tuition fees are lower than the
probability of obtaining an A for L a students only. The results are sorted
according to the distribution of ability in the populations of advantaged and
disadvantaged students, then an interpretation is provided in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.1 Large proportion of H students in both populations
First consider the case (Case 1) in which there is a large number ofH students
in both populations.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold and pa > pd > 1+1 : Then
in equilibrium, gLi > k (= all the students attend university):
1. Grade ination is given with the same proportion to a and d students;
2. The probability of obtaining a job is the same for a and d students;
3. An a student receives a higher salary than a d student.
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Proof. See the appendix.
In Proposition 1, the university inates grades for the same proportion of
a and d students. Therefore, given Lemma 1, their probability of obtaining
a job is the same. Nonetheless, a students provide a higher expected prot
than d students, so that a rm o¤ers them a higher salary.
4.3.2 Small proportion of H d students
In this Section I analyse the case (Case 2) in which there is a small number
of H students in the population of d students only.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold and pa > 1+1 > pd; and
dene b  pa"+ pd [1  pa (1 + ")]
papd
: (10)
For
 gLa > gLd > k (= all the students attend university):
1. Grade ination is given to more a than d students.
2. The probability of obtaining a job is greater for a rather than d
students.
3. A d (a) student receives a higher salary than an a (d) student for
  (>):
 gLa > k > gLd (= all the a students, together with the H d students,
attend university):
1. Grade ination is positive for a students and zero for d students.
2. The probability of obtaining a job is greater for a than d students.
3. A d student receives a higher salary than an a student.
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Proof. See the appendix.
In the equilibria depicted by Proposition 2, a d students expected ability
is lower than before, so that a rm prefers not to hire one of them if too
much grade ination is provided. In order to maximise the number of hired
students, the university inates more grades of a than d students. In the
rst part of Proposition 2, grade ination is high enough so that all the L
students would attend university, a rms preferences towards a student type
(reecting the level of salary) strictly depends on the level of : If a rms
benet from hiring anH student is su¢ ciently, low then d students are o¤ered
a higher salary than a students. This is due to the following reason. The
higher ; the higher a rms expected prot, so that it is willing to hire with
higher probability. As a consequence, the optimal level of grade ination
rises with , but a higher grade ination worsens the education signal and
thus leads a students to be preferred to d students.
In the second part of Proposition 2, grade ination is not su¢ ciently
strong for d students. Thus L students do not attend university as tuition
fees are too high, hence a rm would prefer to hire A students from that
social group (since all of them have high ability), and o¤er them a higher
salary than an a student.
4.3.3 Small proportion of H students in both populations
Consider next the case (Case 3) in which there is a limited amount of H
students in both populations.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold and 1
+1
> pa > pd: For
 gLa > gLd > k (= all the students attend university):
1. Grade ination is given to more a than d students.
2. The probability of obtaining a job is greater for a rather than d
students.
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3. A d student receives a higher salary than an a student.
 gLa > k > gLd (= all the a students, together with the H and d students,
attend university):
1. Grade ination is positive for a students and zero for d students.
2. The probability of obtaining a job is greater for L and a rather
than d students.
3. A d student receives a higher salary than an a student.
Proof. See the appendix.
When the share of H students is low in both populations, the university
lowers the level of grade ination for a students, but this remains higher
than the level of grade ination for d students. The main di¤erence with the
results of Proposition 2 is that a rm unambiguously prefers hiring d rather
than a students, irrespective of , and thus it o¤ers a higher salary to them.
In other words, if the probability of having high ability is su¢ ciently low in
both population, then in equilibrium the lower grade ination conferred to d
students more than o¤sets the e¤ect of pa > pd in the comparison of rms
expected prots (9). This is due to the fact that pa is too low to compensate
the lower grade ination to d students, so that their educational signal is
better.
4.3.4 Remarks
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1, 2 and 3. Function b refers to Case 2 when
gLi > k: In the gure, pa > pd holds above the upward-sloping 45 degrees line.
This is the key assumption and makes a rm obtain a higher expected prot
by hiring advantaged than disadvantaged students, given the same grading
policy. However this may not happen if grading is softer for advantaged
students, as it would raise the expected quality of the disadvantaged and A
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students. On the other hand, a low grade ination may induce L students
not to attend university.
The results show that a targeted grading policy may have the unintended
e¤ect of raising the salary of disadvantaged students more than the advan-
taged ones. Of course there are equilibria in which advantaged students are
preferred to disadvantaged students, as the empirical evidence points out
and depicted for instance by Case 1, but two e¤ects inuence the possible
equilibrium. First, a rms benet obtained by hiring a high-ability student
has ambiguous e¤ects on the results. On the one hand, if  is high it is
more likely that Case 2 or 3 occur, in which the redistributive e¤ect emerges.
On the other hand, in Case 2 the lower a rms benet obtained by hiring
a high-ability student, the higher the preference for hiring a disadvantaged
student.
Corollary 1 A rise in the rms benet for hiring an H student increases
the probability that Case 2 or 3 takes place. In Case 2, it is more likely to be
in the parameter range in which a students are o¤ered a higher salary than
d students.
Second, the e¤ect of a low grade ination in the university attendance.
If grade ination is too low for disadvantaged and low-ability students, then
they would not attend university, by increasing the expected quality of the
disadvantaged graduates.
Corollary 2 Since, by and large, d students need less grade ination in order
to compete with a students, the university attendance of d students will be
lower.
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Figure 2. Equilibria with positive grade ination
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4.3.5 Untargeted grade ination
Finally compare the results obtained with the situation in which grade ina-
tion cannot be targeted. This may happen in a class where both advantaged
and disadvantaged students are mixed together. In this context, a systematic
di¤erence in grading policy according to studentssocial backgrounds would
be assessed as discriminating. With untargeted grade ination, the grading
policy is the same for both populations, thus the result in Case 1 remains the
same as above. In Cases 2 and 3, a and d students have the same probability
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of being hired, and it is more likely that a students are preferred by a rm.
The reason of due to the combination of same grading policy for each pop-
ulation together with pa > pd. Given the same grading policy but a higher
probability of high ability for a students, the expected prot from hiring one
of them is undoubtedly higher. The results can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold, and grade ination is
untargeted, gLa = gLd (= all the students attend university):
 Large proportion of high-ability students in both populations
(Cases 1). For pa > pd > 1+1 ; then the equilibrium is the same as in
Proposition 1.
 Large proportion of low-ability students in the d populations
(Cases 2 and 3). For 1
+1
> pd,
1. The probability of obtaining a job is higher for a than d students.
2. An a student receives a higher salary than a d student.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that the redistributive e¤ect emerged in Proposition
2 and 3 is driven by the presence of targeted grade ination, and it disappears
by ruling out this assumption.
5 Extensions
5.1 Tuition fees di¤erentiation
In this paragraph I consider the possibility that tuition fees may be di¤erent
according to social background. Begin by denoting kd; ka the tuition fees for
d and a students, respectively.
First, assume that tuitions fees are not valued in their absolute, monetary
amount but according to a students household income. Of course if tuition
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fees are a small fraction of the households income, then it is relatively less
costly to pay them than the case in which tuition fees are a substantial
amount of income. Therefore, assuming (consistently with the denition of
social background) that an a students household has a higher income that
a d students household, in turn kd > ka. This strengthen the result shown
by Corollary 2, since it is more likely that a situation in which gLd < kd and
gLa > ka takes place, leading to a higher preference of a rm for d and A
students and a stronger redistributive e¤ect.
Second, consider the presence of a need-based nancial aid covering, to-
tally or partially, tuition fees for students with low socioeconomic status.
These types of policies are currently present in many countries. In particular
in the United States, in which university tuition fees are considerably higher
compared to other countries, the nancial aid is regulated by the Higher
Education Act of 2008and the specic type of help is discretionary to the
educational institution. Out of the United States, many national govern-
ments provide student nancial assistance subsidies for students attending a
university, such as in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Scandinavian countries. Given the presence of need-based policies,
assume ka > kd  0: From Proposition 2 and 3 can be seen that, counterin-
tuitively, these kind of policies may in fact decrease the expected salary of
disadvantaged students, as they would worsen the education signal of these
student types. The foregoing discussion can be summarised as follows.
Corollary 3 Suppose kd > (<) ka; then it is more likely to be in the pa-
rameter range in which d (a) students are o¤ered a higher salary than a (d)
students.
Notice that the relative tuition fees and need-based nancial aid to cover
fees can be considered at the same time. Of course in this situation, the
result depends on which of the two e¤ects prevails.
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5.2 Di¤erent university objectives
So far, the analysis has been carried out with the assumption that the uni-
versity did not have any redistributive aim whatsoever in the studentsjob
opportunities. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to consider the cases where a
university has di¤erent objectives. In what follows I analyse the behaviour
either of a redistributive or of an elitist university. In both the situations, the
university still favours H over L students, since the change in objective func-
tion is about students social background, and the university wants to keep a
good reputation towards rms. As a consequence Lemma 1 still holds, and
below I focus in the equilibria with grade ination, i.e., in which Assumption
2 applies.
5.2.1 Redistributive University
First I examine the situation in which the university is interested in helping
the job opportunities of disadvantaged students. The model can take into
account this by assuming:
Assumption 3 bHd > bHa > bLd > bLa:
In order to favour disadvantaged students, the university can design its
grading policy by keeping a su¢ ciently high grade ination for a students
that makes d students to be preferred in the job market. The results are
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold:
 Large proportion of high-ability students in the a populations
(Cases 1 and 2). For pa > 1+1 :
1. For gLa > gLd > k; all the students attend university, and for
gLa > k > gLd; all the a students, together with the H d students,
attend university;
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2. Grade ination is given to more a than d students, the probability
of obtaining a job is greater for a than d students, and a d student
receives a higher salary than an a student.
 Large proportion of high-ability students in the advantaged
populations (Case 3). For pa < 1+1 ;then the equilibrium is the
same as in Proposition 3.
Proof. See the appendix.
5.2.2 Elitist university
Consider next a university willing to favour advantaged rather than disad-
vantaged students. This may happen in those countries, like the United
States, in which wealthy alumni would give donations to their college. In-
deed evidence shows that students who receive loans or nancial aid are less
likely in the future to make a gift in the future (Meer and Rosen, 2011). The
behaviour of an elitist university can be implemented as follows:
Assumption 4 bHa > bHd > bLa > bLd:
In this case, the university simply tailors grade ination in order to favour
a students: with a large population of H students in both populations it is
su¢ cient to provide the same proportion of grade ination to each social
group. In the other cases, a students are favoured by adopting a grading
policy with higher grade ination for a than d students but su¢ ciently low
to make a rm prefer hiring a students. Therefore in the presence of an elitist
university, a higher proportion of grade ination leads to a higher salary.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 2 and 4 hold.
 Large proportion of high-ability students in both populations
(Cases 1). For pa > pd > 1+1 ; then the equilibrium is the same as in
Proposition 1.
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 Large proportion of low-ability students in the d populations
(Cases 2 and 3). For 1
+1
> pd:
1. For gLa > gLd > k; all the students attend university, and for
gLa > k > gLd; all the a students, together with the H d students,
attend university;
2. Grade ination is given to more a than d students, the probability
of obtaining a job is greater for a than d students, and an a student
receives a higher salary than a d student.
Proof. See the appendix.
6 University competition
In this section, I consider the e¤ects of competition among universities on my
ndings about grade ination. I show that the essential results carry over to
settings with competition.
6.1 Symmetric universities
First assume a competitive university market in which n universities operate
with no entry of other competitors. A university has a payo¤ according to
Assumption 1, i.e., it prefers that an H rather than an L student obtains
a job, and it is indi¤erent to student social background. In a competitive
setting, Assumption 1 implies that a university prefers to enroll H rather
than L students, as they will give to the university a higher payo¤ in the
case they are employed.
Each university can admit a number of students of at most hu 2 (0; 1),
identical for each university, i.e.
Assumption 5
P
u hu = 1; hu = hs > 0; for all u; s = 1; 2; ::; n; u 6= s:
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This is an important assumption, since a university grading strategy cannot
increase its own capacity but only helps to fulll the maximum number of
admitted students. In other words, the maximum supply of enrollment is
xed. Each university decides whether or not to inate grades and, if so, the
amount of grade ination to provide.
Begin with the case in which labour demand is lower than the number of
H students, J < : The result in this case is similar to Lemma 2. Given the
limited number of expected positions and the fact that a university prefers
to enroll H rather than L students, the university will favour the former over
the latter by not inating grades.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and 5 hold and J  . Then each uni-
versity never inates grades and a rm is indi¤erent to a students social
background.
Consider next J > : In this case a university may consider inating
grades in order to increase the number of its students by enrolling some of
the L students. There are two possible cases. In the rst, assume  < hu: If
all but one universities inate grades, then the non-inating university will
attract all the H students, and a rm would only hire those graduates. If
n   1 of the universities do not inate grades while one university deviates,
then all H students would attend one of the n 1 universities, in which there
is always room for them since  < hu; so that the payo¤ of the university
that inates grades will be zero. Therefore even in this case, none of the
university inates grades.
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and  < hu. Then each university
never inates grades and a rm is indi¤erent to a students social background.
In the second case, assume hu <  < J: If n 1 universities inate grades
and one university deviates, it will attract the H students according to its
own size hu, and since a university prefers to enroll H over L students, it will
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increase its own payo¤. Hence even in this case a situation in which all the
universities inate grades is never an equilibrium.
Conversely, if n   1 universities do not inate grades and a university
deviates, then if all the H students nd a placement in the other universities,
then the university that inated grades obtains a zero payo¤. Therefore this is
not an equilibrium, since none of the universities are willing to inate grades.
On the other hand, if some of theseH students cannot nd a placement in the
other universities, they attend the university who inated grades. Indeed,
an H student will score A with certainty for Lemma 1, since even with
competition, a university who inates grades still will do that in such a way
to favour her over an L student. In this case, the university compares the
payo¤ of deviation with the payo¤ of no grade ination:

n
bH > [  (n  1)hu] bH + [gLa (1  pa) + gLd (1  ) (1  pd)] bL; (11)
so that two situations may occur:
Proposition 7 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and hu <  < J:
1. If inequality (11) holds, in equilibrium all universities will not inate
grades;
2. If inequality (11) does not hold, in equilibrium one university inates
grades and the n  1 universities will not inate grades.
Note that, in point 2 of Proposition 7, the deviation strategy would in-
crease the payo¤ of all the other non-inating-grades universities, since they
would ll their studentscapacity with H students. Therefore none of the
other universities has an incentive in deviating, which ensures stability to the
equilibrium. More important, for the case analysed in point 2 of Proposition
7, the equilibria depicted above in the analysis with no university competi-
tion hold for the population of students net of the H students attending the
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university that gives grade ination. Hence the results analysed in the non-
competitive case may apply as a benchmark for some market with symmetric
competition.
Finally, consider the cases examined above in which no grade ination is
given. Accordingly, only H students score A; and in turn none of the L stu-
dents would attend university. Therefore, from an empirical perspective it is
not possible to detect the di¤erence between the equilibrium with full grade
ination occurs and the equilibrium with no grade ination, since all the stu-
dents attending university will indeed score A: The implication is striking: in
a competitive university market, an increase in grade point average may not
be due to a softer grading policy, it might be in fact the result of competition
that skims away low-ability students.
6.2 Duopoly with asymmetric universities
The result depicted in Proposition 7 strictly depends on the assumption
of equal size of all universities. To understand why, consider this second
competitive model. Suppose for simplicity a university duopoly in which one
university (denoted by 1) is larger and the number of H students is higher
than the size of the smaller university (denoted by 2), i.e.:
Assumption 6 h1 > h2 > 0; h1 + h2 = 1:
In cases J < ; J >  > h1; and J > h2 > ; both universities never
inate grades and a rm is indi¤erent to a students social background. The
argumentations of these results are the same described in the symmetric
market.
Consider now J > h1 >  > h2: If University 1 does not inate grades, the
University 2s dominant strategy is not to inate grades. Indeed University 1
may enroll all the H students and thus leaving University 2 with L students
only. However, if University 2 does not inate grades, then University 1
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compares the payo¤ of inating grades with the payo¤ of no grade ination,
i.e., inequality (11) when n = 2:

2
bH > (  h2) bH + [gLa (1  pa) + gLd (1  ) (1  pd)] bL: (12)
Again, two equilibria may occur:
Proposition 8 Suppose Assumption 1 and 6 hold and J > h1 >  > h2:
1. If inequality (12) holds, in equilibrium both universities will not inate
grades;
2. If inequality (12) does not hold, in equilibrium University 1 inates
grades and the University 2 does not inate grades.
In particular for the case illustrated in point 2 of Proposition 8, the equi-
libria depicted above in the analysis with no university competition hold
for the population of students net of the H students attending University
2. Similarly to point 2 of Proposition (7), the results analysed in the non-
competitive case may apply as a benchmark in some market with asymmetric
university competition.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the e¤ects of targeted grade ination when students
di¤er in social background. A university may di¤erentiate grading policy
according to a student type, and in equilibrium it may inate grades with
the e¤ect of increasing the salary o¤ered to disadvantaged students. This
result is stronger the higher the tuition fees and the higher the redistributive
intentions of a university, although it holds even when the university has no
redistributive aim. The results hold to some extent in markets with university
competition.
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Albeit this investigation has a positive avour, there are implications on
the policy side. For instance, a government aiming to reduce the di¤erences
in job opportunities among students di¤ering in social origins not necessarily
should hammer away at grade ination, when policy grading can be targeted.
A possible development may be to evaluate the relationship between grade
ination and university reputation (see Ehlers and Schwager, 2012) when
students di¤er in social background. In this direction, it would be necessary
to modify the framework in a either repeated or dynamic setting, and to
relax the assumption of perfect information about the university strategy.
An interesting follow up paper could analyse how grade ination a¤ects
students e¤ort incentives. For instance, does more grade ination create
perverse incentives for the students to put forth e¤ort? The relation between
grade ination and studentse¤ort is left for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider J = 1: For pa > pd > 1+1 ; the equilibrium would be
gLa = gLd = 1; (13)
thus all the students attend university and obtain a job. Plugging (13) into
(9), hiring an a student always gives a higher expected prot.
However, when pa+pd (1  ) < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students
to obtain a job at the expense ofH students. Therefore the university inates
grades to a number of students that covers labour demand net to the share
of H, i.e.:
gLa = gLd =
J   
 (1  pa) + (1  pd) (1  ) ; (14)
so that an L and a student has the same chance of obtaining a job than an
L and d student. Since k < gLi by Assumption 2, all the students attend
university, and rms compare the expected payo¤s of a d and an a student.
Plugging (14) into (9), hiring an a student gives a higher expected payo¤
always, so that a rm o¤ers a higher salary to them.
Proof of Proposition 2
For pa > 1+1 > pd and J = 1; the university strategy is
gLa = 1; gLd =
pd
1  pd   ": (15)
For k < gLd; all the students attend university, and each rm compares the
expected prots from hiring a d or an a student. Plugging (15) into (9),
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hiring a d student gives a higher expected prot for all
 < b  pa"+ pd [1  pa (1 + ")]
papd
:
Conversely for k > gLd; all the L and a students attend university and none
of the L and d students attend it. Notice that, if the university increases
grade ination above k; then none of the d students would obtain a job, so
that this is the best strategy given the circumstances.
However, when  < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students to obtain
a job at the expense of H students. In order to avoid this, the university
provides grade ination for the proportion of the expected available positions
for low ability students, i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
Thus the result would be
gLa =
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =

pd
1  pd   "

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
(16)
For gLa > gLd > k; then all the students attend university, the probability of
obtaining a job is higher for a rather than d students, and a rm compares
the expected prots from hiring a d or an a student. Plugging (16) into
(9), hiring a d student gives a higher expected prot for all  < b, so that
for   (>) b a rm would o¤er a higher salary to d (a) rather than a (d)
students. On the other hand for gLa > k > gLd; then none of the L and d
students attend university, all the a students attend university, and a rm
would choose to hire d rather than a students.
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Proof of Proposition 3
For 1
+1
> pa > pd and J = 1, the result would be
gLa =
pa
1  pa   "; gLd =
pd
1  pd   ": (17)
For gLa > gLd > k; then all the students attend university, and each rm
compares the expected prots from hiring a d or an a student. Plugging (15)
into (9), hiring a d student gives a higher expected prot always. Conversely
for gLa > k > gLd; all the L and a students attend university and none of the
L and d students attend it.
However, when  < J < 1; this strategy may lead L students to obtain
a job at the expense of H students. Hence the university provides grade
ination in the proportion of the available position for low ability students,
i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
Thus the result would be
gLa =

pa
1  pa   "

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =

pd
1  pd   "

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
(18)
For gLa > gLd > k; all the students attend university, the probability of
obtaining a job is higher for a rather than d students, and a rm compares
the expected prots from hiring a d or an a student. Plugging (18) into (9),
hiring a d student gives a higher expected prot always, so that she is o¤ered
a higher salary than an a student. For gLa > k > gLd; none of the L and d
students attend university, all the a students attend university, and a rm
would choose to hire d rather than a students.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Case 1 does not change compared to the targeted situation, as in Proposition
1 grade ination is the same in both populations.
Consider next Case 2 and 3. First notice that, if the university cannot
target grade ination, it would choose its grading policy according to the dis-
tribution of ability in the d population. Otherwise, if the university applies
the optimal level of grade ination for a students, none of the d students
would be hired, as a rms expected prot from hiring them would be neg-
ative, given the excessive grade ination. Thus by adopting this policy, a
and L students would obtain a job over d and H students, going against
Assumption 1. As a consequence, both in Cases 2 and 3 the level of grade
ination is the same as for d students in Propositions 2 and 3, i.e.:
gLa = gLd =

pd
1  pd   "

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) : (19)
Hence the probability of an L student of being hired is the same along dif-
ferent populations. Since k < gLi by Assumption 2; all the students attend
university, and a rm compares the expected prots from hiring a d or an a
student. Plugging (19) into (9), hiring an a student gives a higher expected
prot always.
Proof of Proposition 5
In Cases 1 (pa > pd > 1+1) and 2 (pa >
1
+1
> pd) and J = 1; the university
maximises its objective function by fully inating grades to a students (gLa =
1) and keeping the level of grade ination of d students in such a way than
a rms expected prot is higher by hiring one of them:
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd+ gLd (1  pd) > pa  (1  pa) : (20)
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Solving for gLd yields gLd <
(1 pa)pd
(1 pd)pa ; so that the optimal level of grade ina-
tion for d students is
gLd =
(1  pa) pd
(1  pd) pa   ": (21)
However, when  < J < 1; the university provides grade ination to a
number of students that covers labour demand net to the share of H, i.e.:
gLa =
J   
 (1  pa) ;
gLd =

(1  pa) pd
(1  pd) pa   "

J   
(1  ) (1  pd) :
(22)
For gLa > k > gLd; then none of the L and d students attend university,
all the a students attend university, and a rm o¤ers a higher salary to a d
rather than a a student. For gLa > gLd > k; then all the students attend
university, and a rm obtains a higher expected payo¤ by hiring a d student.
In Case 3 the equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 3, because with both
universitys objective function, the L and d students are favoured as much
as possible.
Proof of Proposition 6
In Case 1 the university follows the strategy adopted in Proposition 1, be-
cause with both universitys objective function, the L and a students are
favoured as much as possible. In Cases 2 and 3, and J = 1; the result would
be
gLa = 1; gLd =
pd
1  pd   "; (23)
ensuring a rms expected prot is positive by hiring students from both
populations, but such that
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) >
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) ; (24)
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that is
pa  (1  pa) >
pd 

pd
1 pd   "

(1  pd)
pd +

pd
1 pd   "

(1  pd)
; (25)
for
" < "  pd [pa   (1  pa)]
pa (1  pd) :
In order to favour a students in the labour market, the university sets " < ":
When  < J < 1; the university provides grade ination in the proportion
of the available position for low ability students, i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
Thus the result would be
gLa =
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =

pd
1  pd   "

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
(26)
where " < ".
In Case 3 and J = 1; the result would be
gLa =
pa
1  pa   "a; gLd =
pd
1  pd   "d; (27)
ensuring a rms expected prot is positive by hiring students from both
populations, but such that
pa  gLa (1  pa)
pa + gLa (1  pa) >
pd  gLd (1  pd)
pd + gLd (1  pd) : (28)
In order to obtain this, the university needs to provide a slightly less amount
of grade ination to a students, and it does that by setting "a < "d. Indeed
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(28) for
"a >
pa (1  pd) "d
pd (1  pa) ; (29)
which in turn holds for "a < "d: When  < J < 1; the university provides
grade ination in the proportion of the expected position for L students, i.e.:
J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) :
Thus the result would be
gLa =

pd
1  pd   "a

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
gLd =

pd
1  pd   "d

J   
(1  pa)  + (1  pd) (1  ) ;
(30)
where "a >
pa(1 pd)"d
pd(1 pa) :
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